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Judges Henry J. Friendly and 
Benjamin Cardozo: A Tale of Two 
Precedents 
 
David M. Dorsen* 
 
Judge Henry J. Friendly, who served on the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from 1959 to 1986, 
confronted two cases raising precisely the same issues that 
occupied Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo‟s attention forty years 
before, when he served on the New York Court of Appeals, the 
state‟s highest court. In 1923 Judge Cardozo wrote the court‟s 
opinion in Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co.,1 examining whether 
Cunard could avoid liability when a passenger with a claim 
against it failed to send it a notification or file suit within the 
time required by language printed on the passenger‟s ticket. 
Five years later, soon after he became chief judge of that court, 
Cardozo wrote the court‟s majority opinion in Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R.R.,2 “„[p]erhaps the most celebrated of all torts cases‟ 
and one of the best-known American common law cases of all 
time,”3 which concerned a railroad‟s liability for an arguably 
 
*  © 2011 by David M. Dorsen. A.B. Harvard, J.D. Harvard Law School. 
Dorsen is writing a biography of Judge Henry J. Friendly (1903-86). Dorsen 
wishes to thank James R. Zazzali, former Chief Justice of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, for his constructive comments, and the law firm of Wallace 
King Domike & Reiskin, PLLC, for its generous support. 
1. 139 N.E. 226 (N.Y. 1923). 
2. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
3. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 287 (1998) (quoting William L. 
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1953)). For a discussion of 
the reasons why the case is so famous, see RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A 
STUDY IN REPUTATION 41-47 (1990). At the time Judge Cardozo wrote the 
Palsgraf opinion, the issue of foreseeability had been the subject of English 
opinions and had been extensively discussed by legal scholars, almost all of 
whom favored the view taken by the dissent (which supported Mrs. Palsgraf), 
by fixing on whether any force intervened between the tortious act and the 
harm. Arthur L Goodhart, The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent 
Act, 39 YALE L.J. 449 (1930). Thirty-four years later, Professor Goodhart 
wrote to Friendly that while a railroad might foresee that the package in 
1
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unforeseeable accident. Decades later, Friendly shed new light 
on Cardozo‟s venerable opinions. 
Judge Friendly revered Judge Cardozo, listing him, along 
with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Louis Dembitz Brandeis, and 
Learned Hand, as the greatest judges of the twentieth 
century.4 He also cited them frequently in his opinions, 
mentioning Cardozo more often than Brandeis, although less 
often than Holmes.5 Most of all, Judge Friendly primarily 
referred to Cardozo as a judge, and not Justice, because his 
most famous opinions were handed down while on the New 
York Court of Appeals. Friendly appreciated Cardozo‟s pithy 
aphorisms and wove them into his opinions. Among Judge 
Cardozo‟s statements that Judge Friendly employed were: 
“[T]he criminal is to go free because the constable has 
blundered”;6 “Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior [for a 
fiduciary]”;7 “[W]e are not to close our eyes as judges to what 
we perceive as men”;8 and “It will not do to decide the same 
question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite 
way between another.”9 More technical Cardozo statements 
also attracted Judge Friendly‟s attention: “Our concern is to 
define the meaning [of the statutory term] for the purpose of a 
 
Palsgraf contained an explosive, “it would be unreasonable to require the 
railway in every instance to act as if the contents of the package were of this 
dangerous nature.” Letter from Arthur L. Goodhart to Henry J. Friendly 
(Nov. 27, 1964) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library (Henry J. 
Friendly Collection, Box 95, Folder 5)). 
4. Henry J. Friendly, Judge Learned Hand, 29 BROOK. L. REV. 6, 6-7 
(1962), reprinted in HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 309 (1967). 
5. According to my count, Friendly cited Holmes in 78 of his opinions, 
Cardozo in 57, and Brandeis in 53. 
6. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926), quoted in Collins v. 
Beto, 348 F.2d 823, 831 (5th Cir. 1965). 
7. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928), quoted in 
Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1344 (2d Cir. 1971). 
8. People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 129 N.E.202, 208 
(N.Y. 1920), quoted in Donovan v. Bierworth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 
1982). 
9. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS 33 (1921), quoted in 
Estate of Carter v. Comm‟r, 453 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Noonan v. 
Cunard S.S. Co., 375 F.2d 69, 71 n.2 (2d Cir. 1967); SEC v. Canandaigua 
Enters., 339 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1964). 
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particular statute which must be read in light of the mischief to 
be corrected and the end to be attained”10 and “We must know 
what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say 
whether it is right or wrong.”11 
While Judge Friendly‟s respect for Judge Cardozo was 
enormous, he was not willing to follow uncritically the master‟s 
precepts. He marched to his own internal judicial drummer. 
Part of the reason was that in dealing with two important 
problems, the usually prescient Judge Cardozo was more 
reluctant than usual to take a modern view, as he did in 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company.12 Friendly wrote a 
liberating opinion in both In re Kinsman Transit Company,13 
which raised issues similar to Palsgraf, but in a fact pattern 
that many would have thought existed only in law-school 
examinations, and Silvestri v. Italia Societa per Azioni di 
Navigazione,14 where the facts paralleled those in Murray. 
Judge Friendly, a judge best known for his statutory opinions, 
moved the common law forward in the best spirit of its 
development. Although frequently described as a 
conservative,15 his perspective led him to be more generous to 
plaintiffs than was Judge Cardozo. 
 
10. Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 158 (1934), quoted in United States 
v. Capanegro, 576 F.2d 973, 979 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978). Friendly cited Cardozo 
frequently in his academic writing. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a 
Lawyer-Newly-Become-Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218 (1961), reprinted in FRIENDLY, 
supra note 4. 
11. United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 294 
U.S. 499, 511 (1935), quoted in ABC Air Freight Co. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 
391 F.2d 295, 300 (2d Cir. 1968). 
12. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (abolishing the requirement of privity to 
recover from the manufacturer of defective merchandise). 
13. 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964). 
14. 388 F.2d. 11 (2d Cir. 1968). 
15. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 240 n.p (1981) (citing Sheldon Goldman, Conflict in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 1965-1971: A Quantitative Analysis, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 635, 
647-50 (1973)); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL 304-05 (1998). 
Friendly‟s reputation as a conservative stems largely from articles he wrote 
on the criminal law, including: The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1965); The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: 
The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968); and Is 
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 142 (1970). 
3
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Before Henry J. Friendly was a lawyer and a judge, he was 
an aspiring historian. At Harvard College he studied old 
European history under the prominent Harvard historian 
Charles McIlwain, received his Bachelor of Arts degree summa 
cum laude, and almost joined the Harvard History 
Department.16 At Harvard Law School he became president of 
the Harvard Law Review and again graduated summa cum 
laude with the highest numerical grade-point average at the 
school since Justice Brandeis, class of 1879. Fittingly, he then 
clerked for Justice Brandeis himself.17 He was appointed fifty 
years ago—after thirty-one years in private practice—to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where 
he earned the title of outstanding federal appeals judge of his 
generation, coupled with Learned Hand as one of the best 
federal judges never to have made it to the Supreme Court.18 
 
I. 
 
Judge Friendly‟s opinion in Kinsman involved an incident 
on the night of January 21, 1959, when two ice jams on the 
 
16. McIlwain wrote to Friendly: “I have no hesitation in saying to you 
that of all the students I have come in contact with in my whole teaching 
experience of some twenty years, you are the best fitted for this work.” Letter 
from Charles McIlwain, to Henry J. Friendly (Sept. 7, 1923) (on file with Joan 
Friendly Goodman, daughter of Judge Friendly). 
17. In re Howard, 210 F. Supp. 301, 302 (W.D. Pa. 1962). Justice 
Brandeis had the highest average under a superseded grading system while 
Friendly had the highest average under the new system. Audio Tape: 
Friendly Oral History, held by the Center for Oral History (July 4, 1974) (on 
file with author). 
18. For example, Chief Justice Warren Burger said of Judge Friendly: “I 
can‟t possibly identify any judicial colleague more highly qualified to have 
come to the Supreme Court of the United States than Henry Friendly.” Chief 
Justice Warren Burger, U.S. Supreme Ct., In Memoriam: Hon. Henry J. 
Friendly, Address Before the Extraordinary Session of the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit (June 9, 1986) in 805 F.2d LXXXVI. Justice Lewis 
Powell said: “His intellect can be ranked with that of Paul Freund—the most 
brilliant members of our profession I have ever known personally.” Letter 
from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Ct., to Judge Louis H. 
Pollak, Senior Dist. Judge, E. Dist. of Pa. (May 21, 1986) (on file with author). 
Harvard Law School Dean Erwin N. Griswold stated: “In my opinion, he was 
the ablest lawyer of my generation.” Erwin N. Griswold, In Memoriam: Henry 
J. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1720, 1720 (1986). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/3
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Buffalo River broke loose after a “rain and thaw followed a 
period of freezing weather.”19 Propelled by the current, large 
chunks of ice and other debris lodged in the space between the 
MacGilvray Shiras, a ship owned by Kinsman Transit and 
Continental Grain Company, and the dock of the Concrete 
Elevator, owned by Continental. The buildup exerted pressure 
on the ship until the Shiras‟ “stern lines parted, and [she] 
drifted into the current” at about 10:40 P.M.20 “Careening stern 
first down the S-shaped river,” Judge Friendly explained, “the 
Shiras, at about 11 P.M., struck the bow of the Michael K. 
Tewksbury”—owned by another company—which had been 
well-moored in a protected area.21 The collision pushed the 
Tewksbury into the river and “she too drifted [downstream, 
closely] followed by the Shiras.”22 
Observers “called the Coast Guard, [who] called the city 
fire station on the river, [who] in turn warned the crew on the 
Michigan Avenue” drawbridge, located three miles downstream 
from the Concrete Elevator.23 Although approximately twenty 
minutes had passed since the accident and although it took just 
two minutes and ten seconds to raise the drawbridge to full 
height, “the bridge was just being raised when, at 11:17 P.M., 
the Tewksbury crashed into its center.”24 A shift change was 
scheduled for 11 P.M.; the operator on the earlier shift was in a 
tavern when the fire station call reached the bridge, and the 
second shift did not arrive until shortly before a second call to 
the bridge—and the crash.25 Grounded, the Tewksbury stopped 
in the wreckage of the bridge against the stern of another ship 
that was moored next to the bridge, and the Shiras plowed into 
the Tewksbury.26 The ships and debris “substantially dammed 
the flow [of the river], causing [it] to back up and flood 
installations on the banks” as far upstream as the Concrete 
 
19. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 712. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 712-13. 
25. Id. at 713. 
26. Id. 
5
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Elevator.27 In addition to property damage, which included 
damage to property adjacent to the bridge from its falling 
towers, “[t]wo [members] of the bridge crew suffered injuries.”28 
Claims, cross-claims, and third-party claims inundated the 
U.S. district court in Buffalo.29 Sitting without a jury, District 
Judge Harold P. Burke applied the federal law of admiralty to 
decide who was liable and just how far a negligent party‟s 
liability should reach down the chain of events.30 He also had to 
decide claims between parties that were at least partially at 
fault, like Continental, which docked the Shiras but also 
suffered damage to the Concrete Elevator, and the City of 
Buffalo, which was responsible for maintaining the river and 
manning the drawbridge but found its drawbridge damaged 
when two ships collided with it.31 In admiralty, unlike 
negligence under the laws of most states, when a plaintiff as 
well as a defendant is negligent, a court can reduce the award 
to the victorious plaintiff because he was partially at fault; 
when several parties are at fault, the judge can order them 
share the damages in proportion to their culpability. 32 Judge 
Burke made a variety of awards, which the Second Circuit 
proceeded to review.33 
Before taking up what he regarded as “the most serious 
issues,” Judge Friendly made several preliminary findings.34 
First, the City was not negligent for failure to take action to 
prevent the buildup of ice on the river.35 Second, the manner of 
 
27. Id. 
28. Id. Judge Friendly had a passion for facts, and paid special attention 
to them in his opinions. He would read the appendices to the parties‟ briefs as 
well as the briefs themselves and, on occasion, he would ask for and examine 
the entire trial-court record. Lawrence B. Pedowitz, Judge Friendly: A Clerk’s 
Perspective, 1978 ANN. SURV. AM. L. xviii, xix (1979).    
29. Id. at 711-14. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. 2 C.J.S. Admiralty § 115 (2003). The law of admiralty does not utilize 
the terms “plaintiff” and “defendant.” However, they are used here for 
simplicity. 
33. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 713. 
34. Id. at 717. 
35. Id. at 713-14. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/3
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the mooring of the Shiras was negligent.36 Third, under the 
arcane provisions of the admiralty law there were limitations 
on the extent of Kinsman‟s liability because the owners of the 
family corporation were insufficiently involved in the events to 
impose full liability on the corporation.37 Fourth, the 
Tewksbury and its owner Midland were not negligent in the 
manner in which that ship was moored.38 
That left three major issues, the first of which was the 
City‟s failure to raise the bridge in time. Judge Friendly began: 
“If this were a run of the mine negligence case, the City‟s 
argument against liability for not promptly raising the 
Michigan Avenue Bridge would be impressive.”39 No vessels 
were expected—the tugs quit at 4 P.M.—“it would have been 
consistent with prudence for the city to relieve the bridge crews 
of their duties.”40 The City would not be liable “because out of 
abundance of caution, it had ordered them to be present when 
prudence did not so require.”41 However, this was no “run of the 
mine negligence case.” The difference resided in section 4 of the 
Federal Bridge Act of 1906,42 which required that when a 
drawbridge is constructed over a navigable stream, “then the 
draw shall be opened promptly by the persons owning or 
operating such bridge upon reasonable signal for the passage of 
boats and other water craft.”43 A federal regulation related to 
the statute read: “The draws of these bridges shall be opened 
promptly on signal for the passage of any vessel at all times 
during the day or night except as otherwise provided by this 
section.”44 No exception applied.45 
 The second major issue was the allocation of damages 
between Kinsman and Continental, on the one hand, and the 
City, on the other hand. “We speedily overrule the objections of 
 
36. Id. at 714. 
37. Id. at 714-16. 
38. Id. at 716-17. 
39. Id. at 717. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. 33 U.S.C. § 494 (2006). 
43. Id. 
44. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 718 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 203.707(e) (1961)). 
45. Id. 
7
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Kinsman and Continental . . . . [A]n actor whose negligence has 
set a dangerous force in motion is not saved from liability for 
harm it has caused to innocent persons solely because another 
has negligently failed to take action that would have avoided 
this.”46 The argument that someone down the line negligently 
failed to stop the force and therefore should be the sole person 
liable “grows out of the discredited notion that only the last 
wrongful act can be a cause—a notion as faulty in logic as it is 
wanting in fairness. The established principle [of sharing the 
payment of damages] is especially appealing in admiralty, 
which will divide the damages among the negligent actors or 
non-actors.”47 The award of damages proportionate to a party‟s 
fault eliminates the search for the sole blameworthy actor. 
Thus, although some common law precedent supported 
Kinsman and Continental, Judge Friendly concluded that 
admiralty law precedent, although not absolutely clear, favored 
the City.48 
The third major issue was the relevancy of the fact that 
“[t]he allegedly unexpectable character of the events [led] to 
much of the damage.”49 Judge Friendly wrote: “The very 
statement of the case suggests the need for considering 
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. . . . and the closely related 
problem of liability for unforeseeable consequences.”50 In 
Palsgraf, an injury to Helen Palsgraf took place when a late-
arriving passenger, fighting his way onto a crowded moving 
train assisted by a push by a railroad guard, dropped a 
newspaper-covered package onto the tracks.51 Nothing 
indicated the package contained fireworks, which exploded 
when they hit the ground.52 The force of the detonation 
overturned a penny weighing machine twenty-five or thirty feet 
 
46. Id. at 719. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 718-21. 
49. Id. at 721. 
50. Id. at 721. The Palsgraf case, Judge Friendly noted, was 
incorporated into the law of admiralty by an opinion written by Judge 
Learned Hand. Id. (citing Sinram v. Pa. R.R., 61 F.2d 767, 770 (2d Cir. 1932). 
51. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
52. Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/3
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away, perhaps less, and it fell on Mrs. Palsgraf.53 She sued the 
Long Island Railroad for her injuries and won a jury verdict, 
which the New York Appellate Division affirmed.54 New York‟s 
highest court, however, reversed and dismissed the case in a 
four-to-three opinion, with Judge Cardozo writing for the 
majority.55 
Judge Cardozo‟s opinion explained that, “the orbit of the 
danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be 
the orbit of the duty . . . . The risk reasonably to be perceived 
defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is 
risk to another or to others within the range of 
apprehension.”56 Judge Friendly observed that Judge Cardozo 
 
53. Id. at 105 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
54. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 225 N.Y.S. 412 (App. Div. 1927). 
55. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99. Posner states that Cardozo‟s statement of 
facts “is both elliptical and slanted” in favor of the railroad. POSNER, supra 
note 3, at 38. For example, the book points out that Cardozo called the bundle 
small even though witnesses had described it as large and that Cardozo said 
nothing about the distance of the scale from the fall of the fireworks. Id. at 
39. It was Judge Andrews‟ dissent that provided the information about the 
location of the scale. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 105 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
Posner also described Judge Cardozo‟s opinion as an “audacious denial that 
the railroad had been culpably negligent.” POSNER, supra note 3, at 40. 
Friendly did not challenge Judge Cardozo‟s statement of the facts. In re 
Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964). While the details of the 
facts in Palsgraf were of limited relevance to his opinion in Kinsman, Judge 
Friendly certainly recognized that the stronger the facts were for the 
railroad, the easier it was to find in favor of plaintiffs in Kinsman. Id. 
56. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100. Cardozo‟s use of the term “duty” was 
standard at the time; Judge Andrews used the term. Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., 
dissenting). The dissent in Palsgraf took a broader and more practical view of 
liability: 
 
Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be 
expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if 
he be outside what would generally be thought the danger 
zone . . . . But there is one limitation. The damages must be 
so connected with the negligence that the latter may be said 
to be the proximate cause of the former. 
 
Id. at 103. The law stated in the dissent is the law in most states. POSNER, 
supra note 3, at 41. Judge Posner was far too harsh on Judge Andrews when 
he wrote, “Judge Andrews‟s dissent, which although much praised is inept.” 
Id. at 45. Judge Andrews supplied important facts omitted by Judge Cardozo. 
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 105 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
9
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had found “the Long Island Railroad owed no „duty‟ to Mrs. 
Palsgraf under the circumstances,” although it might owe a 
duty in other circumstances, such as “if Mrs. Palsgraf had been 
injured by the fall of improperly loaded objects from a passing 
train.”57 It had no duty because there was no “notice that the 
package contained a substance demanding the exercise of any 
care toward anyone so far away; Mrs. Palsgraf was not 
considered to be within the area of apparent hazard created by 
whatever lack of care the guard had displayed to the 
anonymous carrier of the unknown fireworks.”58 
Friendly compared Kinsman with Palsgraf: “We see little 
similarity between the Palsgraf case and the situation before 
us . . . . [A] ship insecurely moored in a fast flowing river is a 
known danger not only to herself but to owners of all other 
ships and structures down-river, and to the persons upon 
them.”59 Foreseeable consequences included damage to the 
bridge and “partial damming that would flood property 
upstream,” particularly, as Judge Friendly noted, the length of 
one of the two loose ships was two-and-one-half times and the 
other was three times the width of the channel at the bridge.60 
Also foreseeable was that the drawbridge would not be raised 
“since, apart from other reasons, there was no assurance of 
timely warning.”61 It may have been less foreseeable that the 
Shiras would have made it so far down the river, but the 
current was swift and, on learning of the Shiras‟ breaking 
loose, Continental‟s employees and others “foresaw precisely 
that.”62 Thus, “all the claimants here met the Palsgraf 
requirement of being persons to whom the actors owed a „duty 
of care‟ . . . .”63 “Although the obvious risks from not raising the 
 
57. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 721 (2d Cir. 1964). 
58. Id. Friendly employed a footnote to observe that “[t]here was 
exceedingly little evidence of negligence of any sort. . . . How much ink would 
have been saved over the years if the Court of Appeals had reversed Mrs. 
Palsgraf‟s judgment on the basis that there was no evidence of negligence at 
all.” Id. at n.5. 
59. Id. at 721-22 (emphasis added). 
60. Id. at 722. 
61. Id. at 723. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 722 (emphasis added). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/3
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bridge were damage to itself and to the vessels, the danger of a 
fall of the bridge and of flooding would not have been 
unforeseeable under the circumstances to anyone who gave 
them thought.”64 Judge Friendly cautioned that “such post hoc 
step by step analysis would render „foreseeable‟ almost 
anything that has in fact occurred; if the argument relied upon 
has legal validity, it ought not be circumvented by 
characterizing as foreseeable what almost no one would in fact 
have foreseen . . . .”65 
Judge Friendly still had to respond to the argument. He 
stated: 
 
that the manner in which several of the 
claimants were harmed, particularly by the flood 
damage, was unforeseeable and that recovery for 
this may not be had—whether the argument is 
put in the forthright form that unforeseeable 
damages are not recoverable or is concealed 
under a formula of lack of “proximate cause.”66 
 
About this issue Judge Friendly later wrote to a Harvard 
Professor: “I must confess there is no phase of law that seems 
more baffling and unsusceptible of clear statement than the 
causation problem.”67 This was not an issue that Palsgraf could 
answer. “Chief Judge Cardozo did not reach the issue of 
„proximate cause‟ for which the case is often cited.”68 
 
64. Id. at 723. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 722-23 (emphasis added). This sentence was quintessential 
Friendly. In a few words he described concepts that many might think were 
identical while others would not see as even similar, and at the same time 
expressed his preference for one of the formulations. 
67. Letter from Henry J. Friendly, to Robert Keeton (Nov. 10, 1964) (on 
file with the Harvard Law School Library (Henry J. Friendly Collection, Box 
211, Folder 13)). 
68. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 722-23 & n.8. Cardozo had written: 
 
The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to 
the case before us. The question of liability is always 
anterior to the question of the measure of the consequences 
that go with liability. If there is no tort to be redressed, 
11
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Judge Friendly‟s analysis favored plaintiffs: “The weight of 
authority in this country rejects the limitation of damages to 
consequences foreseeable at the time of the negligent conduct 
when the consequences are „direct,‟ and the damage, although 
other and greater than expectable, is of the same general sort 
that was risked.”69 His discussion of foreseeability was 
uncommonly clear and expansive, although, as he conceded, his 
opinion provided little in the way of guidance and left much to 
the intuition of the judge: 
 
We see no reason why an actor engaging in 
conduct which entails a large risk of small 
damage and a small risk of other and greater 
damage, of the same general sort, from the same 
forces, and to the same class of persons, should 
be relieved of responsibility for the latter simply 
because the chance of its occurrence, if viewed 
alone, may not have been large enough to require 
the exercise of care. . . . This does not mean that 
the careless actor will always be held for all 
 
there is no occasion to consider what damage might be 
recovered if there were a finding of a tort. 
 
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). Analysis of the 
issue of proximate cause arguably should precede considerations of 
foreseeability. If the tort did not cause the injury, there is no reason to 
consider whether the injury was foreseeable. 
69. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 724. Judge Friendly noted that English law 
imposed liability when the injury was caused somewhat differently than 
could be expected, providing the damages were “direct.” Id. at 723. He was 
skeptical: 
 
[W]e would find it difficult to understand why one who had 
failed to use the care required to protect others in the light 
of expectable forces should be exonerated when the very 
risks that rendered his conduct negligent produced other 
and more serious consequences to such persons than were 
fairly foreseeable when he fell short of what the law 
demanded. 
 
Id. at 723-24. The parties‟ briefs in Kinsman had not mentioned English law. 
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damages for which the forces that he risked were 
a cause in fact. Somewhere a point will be 
reached when courts will agree that the link has 
become too tenuous—that what is claimed to be 
consequence is only fortuity. Thus, if the 
destruction of the Michigan Avenue Bridge had 
delayed the arrival of a doctor, with consequent 
loss of a patient‟s life, few judges would impose 
liability on any of the parties here . . . . It would 
be pleasant if greater certainty were possible, 
but the many efforts that have been made at 
defining the locus of the “uncertain and wavering 
line” are not very promising; what courts do in 
such cases makes better sense that what they, or 
others, say.70 
 
At this point Judge Friendly turned from a restatement of 
the repeatedly explored law of foreseeability to an analysis that 
included language perhaps reflecting the budding law and 
economics movement, whose leaders included then professors 
and now judges, Guido Calabresi71 and Richard A. Posner:72 
 
Where the line will be drawn will vary from age 
to age; as society has come to rely increasingly on 
insurance and other methods of loss-sharing, the 
point may lie further off than a century ago. Here 
it is surely more equitable that the losses from 
the operators‟ negligent failure to raise the 
Michigan Avenue Bridge should be ratably borne 
by Buffalo‟s taxpayers than left with the 
innocent victims of the flooding . . . .73 
 
70. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 725 (internal citations omitted). 
71. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach 
to Non-Fault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 725-34 (1965). 
72. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (2007). 
73. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 725-26. Judge Andrews‟ dissent in Palsgraf, 
which focused on the issue of proximate cause, raised a hypothetical similar 
to Friendly‟s delayed doctor, and said: “[I]t is all a question of expediency. 
There are no fixed rules to govern our judgment. . . . There is in truth little to 
guide us other than common sense.” Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 104 (Andrews, J., 
13
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In fact, a memorandum that Friendly wrote to his fellow judges 
on the panel was more forward-looking than his statement in 
his opinion: 
 
If there were any way in which the doctrine could 
be manipulated so as to correspond with 
probable insurance that would be fine, and in our 
case one may guess there to be more likelihood 
that the property owners were insured against 
flood damages than that Continental‟s liability 
insurance would be equal to the strain. But 
suppose Joe Doak, who was standing by the river 
bank, had been drowned? On the whole, it seems 
best not to bring into negligence law the 
„foreseeability‟ doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale so 
far as concerns damages rather than the 
determination of negligence. . . . I submit that 
importing foreseeability into determining the 
scope of damages for negligence is unsound in 
theory and unworkable in practice.74 
 
The decree entered by the Second Circuit apportioned the 
losses among the various responsible parties: Buffalo recovered 
two-thirds of the damages to its property from Continental and 
Kinsman; Continental recovered two-thirds of its damages from 
the City and Kinsman; and Kinsman, which made no claim 
against Continental, recovered half of the damages suffered by 
the Shiras at the bridge from the City and Continental.75 More 
than four decades after Kinsman, Judge Calabresi commented 
on Judge Friendly‟s opinion: “I think Friendly was definitely 
 
dissenting). At some point the two approaches converge. See Case Comment, 
Proximate Cause—Last Clear Chance—Admiralty: Foreseeability 
Requirement and the “Freak Accident,” 49 MINN. L. REV. 1052, 1058-59 
(1965). 
74. Memorandum from Henry J. Friendly, to Judges Leonard P. Moore 
& Sterry R. Waterman (Apr. 13, 1964) (on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library (Henry J. Friendly Collection, Box 29, Folder 19)). 
75. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 726-27. 
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foreseeing law and economics type analysis. He was doing it 
more through intuition than systematically. But . . . his judicial 
intuition more often got it correct than the analysis of many a 
law and economics scholar.”76 
Judge Leonard P. Moore dissented only from the portion of 
Judge Friendly‟s opinion that sustained the award of damages 
caused by the flooding of the upstream properties. Judge Moore 
took a different view of the foreseeability of the harm, 
concluding that “the fortuitous circumstance of the vessels so 
arranging themselves as to create a dam is much „too tenuous,‟” 
and compared the events to “the humorous and almost-beyond-
all-imagination sequences depicted by the cartoonist . . . Rube 
Goldberg,” hugely famous a half-century ago.77 Judge Moore‟s 
principal concern was that “[j]udgment would be entered 
against the defendant which court or jury decided was best able 
to pay.”78 Thus, his analysis favored defendants and was less 
forward-looking than Judge Friendly‟s, voting for the 
defendants on this claim despite the fact that the injured 
upriver property owners were far less able than the defendants 
to protect against and distribute the costs of the accident 
among a broader swath of people. 
The parties provided Judge Friendly with precious little 
help. When he saw that the briefs cited no rules or regulations 
relating to the Bridge Act, his experience and intuition led him 
to tell his law clerk, Pierre N. Leval, now a judge on the Second 
Circuit, to go to the law library to see if there were any 
applicable rules or regulations.79 Leval found the regulation 
cited above that required drawbridges to be opened “promptly 
on signal for the passage of any vessel at all times during the 
day or night except as otherwise provided in this section.”80 The 
uncovered regulation played an important role in the decision. 
 
76. E-mail from Guido Calabresi, Senior Cir. Judge, 2d Cir., to author 
(Sept. 18, 2008) (on file with author). 
77. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 727-28 (Moore, J., concurring and dissenting). 
78. Id. at 727. 
79. Interview with Pierre N. Leval, Senior Cir. Judge, 2d Cir., in N.Y., 
N.Y. (Oct. 17, 2006). 
80. 33 C.F.R. § 203.707(e) (1961); Interview with Judge Pierre N. Leval, 
supra note 79; see also supra text accompanying notes 34-44. 
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The briefs of the four parties were deficient in other respects. 
Incredibly, only one of the briefs filed so much as cited 
Palsgraf; without any discussion or analysis the City‟s brief 
simply quoted two short passages from Judge Cardozo‟s 
majority opinion.81 The consideration of foreseeability in the 
City‟s brief—again the only brief that even mentioned the 
issue—was limited to the question of whether the City had any 
expectation that ships would be on the Buffalo River that 
night.82 Judge Friendly generously expanded the City‟s meager 
and off-center argument on foreseeability.83 
What is even more startling is that none of the briefs filed 
in Kinsman were as good on the principal issue as the brief of 
the Long Island Railroad in Palsgraf, argued thirty-six years 
earlier and obviously without the benefit of Judge Cardozo‟s 
opinion. Mrs. Palsgraf‟s brief limited itself to mundane 
statements like: “The defendant having set in motion a chain of 
events was liable for the result thereof.”84 The railroad‟s brief, 
however, was surprisingly sophisticated for one written in the 
late 1920s. Judge Richard Posner did not do it justice when he 
wrote: “The opinion owes, by the way, nothing to the briefs, 
which are competent and well written, but nothing more; 
alongside Cardozo‟s opinion they are pedestrian”; “[t]he 
railroad‟s brief is not markedly superior to the plaintiff‟s.”85 
 
81. Brief for the City of Buffalo, In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 
(2d Cir. 1964) (No. 238-243, 28387-28392). 
82. Id. 
83. Friendly explained a legal rationale in a memorandum to the other 
members of the panel: “Although the Palsgraf point was not specifically 
argued, Continental‟s (and Kinsman‟s) claims that the City should be held 
solely liable for everything and they for nothing, surely include the lesser 
claim that they should not be held liable for damage from the damming and 
flooding.” Memorandum from Henry J. Friendly, to Judges Leonard P. Moore 
and Sterry R. Waterman (Mar. 4, 1964) (on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library (Henry J. Friendly Collection, Box 211, Folder 13)). 
84. Plaintiff-Respondent‟s Brief from Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. 
reprinted in 2 RECORDS AND BRIEFS OF LANDMARK BENJAMIN CARDOZO 
OPINIONS 10 (Doc. 20) (William H. Manz, ed. 2001). Judge Posner accurately 
called Palsgraf‟s argument “standard analysis.” POSNER, supra note 3, at 37. 
85. POSNER, supra note 3, at 45, 48. Judge Posner was correct to the 
extent that his comment referred to considerations of style—an important 
part of his discussion of Cardozo‟s legacy—but not necessarily considerations 
applicable to a party trying to win a case. 
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After arguing that its employees were not negligent, the 
railroad‟s brief turned to the issue of causality.86 The railroad 
first claimed an absence of proximate cause and then continued 
with language that undoubtedly assisted Judge Cardozo to 
write his landmark opinion and, indeed, gave him the 
opportunity to jettison the arguably superfluous concept of 
“duty”87 on which he nevertheless chose to rely: 
 
Defendant‟s employees not knowing the contents 
of the package carried by the passenger could not 
reasonably foresee or anticipate that it might 
explode. Such an occurrence is not a natural and 
probable consequence of assisting a passenger to 
board a train. . . . “In other words negligence is 
not a matter to be judged after the occurrence; it 
is always a question of what reasonably prudent 
men under the same circumstances would or 
should in the exercise of reasonable care have 
anticipated.” 
 
“We think that ordinary caution did not involve 
forethought of this extraordinary peril.” 
 
“[The defendant] became answerable in other 
words for those consequences that ought to have 
been foreseen by a reasonably prudent man.”88 
 
Despite his seeming endorsement in Kinsman of Judge 
Cardozo‟s product, it is far from clear that Judge Friendly was 
enamored of Palsgraf‟s usefulness in the contemporary world. 
 
86. Points for Appellant from Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. reprinted in 2 
RECORDS AND BRIEFS OF LANDMARK BENJAMIN CARDOZO OPINIONS, supra note 
84, at Doc. 19, 5-12. 
87. The railroad may have seen that it adds little, if anything, to the 
analysis to say that the railroad owed Mrs. Palsgraf a duty not to cause a 
boarding passenger to drop a package on her foot but not a duty to cause the 
passenger to drop a package that explodes. Duty seems to describe the result 
rather than lead to it. 
88. Points for Appellant from Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., supra note 
86, at 6-8 (citations omitted). 
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His Kinsman opinion noted: “Since all the claimants here met 
the Palsgraf requirement . . . we are not obliged to reconsider 
whether that case furnishes as useful a standard for 
determining the boundaries [of liability] in admiralty for 
negligent conduct as was thought . . . when Palsgraf was still in 
its infancy.”89 Judge Friendly did not explain what he meant by 
his statement, which certainly suggested a measure of 
reservation, until four years after Kinsman in Ira S. Bushey & 
Sons, Inc. v. United States,90 his only other opinion that 
discussed Palsgraf. Bushey involved an inebriated seaman who 
opened valves that flooded a drydock, causing serious 
damage.91 Judge Friendly concluded: “The risk that seamen 
going and coming from [their ship] might cause damage to the 
drydock is enough to make it fair that the enterprise bear the 
loss.”92 Significantly, he turned for support not to Judge 
Cardozo, but to Judge Andrews, the author of the dissenting 
opinion in Palsgraf, who seemed to take the more pragmatic 
approach. Judge Friendly wrote: 
 
It is not a fatal objection that the rule we lay 
down lacks sharp contours; in the end, as Judge 
Andrews said in a related context, “it is all a 
question [of expediency] of fair judgment, always 
keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to 
make a rule in each case that will be practical 
and in keeping with the general understanding 
of mankind.”93 
 
 
89. 338 F.2d at 722. 
90. 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968). 
91. Id. at 167. 
92. Id. at 172. This conclusion contains strains of Professor Goodhart‟s 
letter to Judge Friendly that while a railroad might foresee that the package 
in Palsgraf contained an explosive, “it would be unreasonable to require the 
railway in every instance to act as if the contents of the package were of this 
dangerous nature.” See Letter from Arthur L. Goodhart, supra note 3. 
Friendly, like Goodhart, was stepping away from an analysis based solely on 
foreseeability. 
93. Bushey, 398 F.2d at 172 (alteration in original) (quoting Palsgraf v. 
Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)). 
Friendly saw merit in Judge Andrews‟ analysis. 
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Judge Friendly seemed willing to discard Judge Cardozo‟s 
concepts of duty and foreseeability in favor of a focus on basic 
fairness and practicality and the growing concerns of law and 
economics. 
 
II. 
 
The second case in which Judge Friendly confronted a 
precedent written by Judge Cardozo—where the later judge 
had even more serious reservations—involved the extent to 
which a steamship company could hold a passenger to 
notification and filing requirements printed on his ticket that 
are more demanding than those imposed by the law. Silvestri v. 
Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione94 grew out of an injury 
to Ciro Silvestri while a transatlantic passenger from the 
United States to Italy aboard the Italian Line‟s S.S. Leonardo 
da Vinci. The district court granted summary judgment against 
Silvestri because of his failure to begin the action within one 
year, as required by Article 30 of the Terms and Conditions 
printed on his ticket.95 A “box” in the upper right hand corner 
of Silvestri‟s ticket was in Italian and English and bore the 
words “PASSAGE CONTRACT.”96 
 
Almost all of the captions in the “box” were in 
capital or bold face letters, the major exception 
being the following statements, which appeared 
in the upper left hand corner of the ticket in 
 
94. 388 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968). 
95. Id. at 12-13. The first sentence of Article 30 read: 
 
No action or proceeding against the Company for death or 
injury of any kind to the passenger shall be instituted, 
unless written notice is given to the Company or its duly 
authorized Agent within six months from the day when the 
death or injury occurred and the action or suit arising 
therefrom is commenced within one year from the date 
when the death or injury occurred. 
 
Id. at 13 n.1. 
96. Id. at 14. 
19
618 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31:2 
 
ordinary lower-case one-eighteenth inch type: 
 
“Il presente biglietto di passagio è soggetto alle 
condizioni stampate sulla copertina e sui fogli n° 
1 e 2. 
 
Subject to the conditions printed on the cover of 
this ticket which form part of this contract.” 
 
The inconspicuousness of these statements was 
increased by the fact that they were squeezed 
immediately below a caption in bold face and to 
the left of one in capital letters. The two “leaves” 
which are an integral part of the coupon retained 
by the passengers were headed “TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS” in bold face. Then followed 35 
numbered paragraphs in very small print. At the 
end were spaces for signature by or for the 
passenger, but neither Silvestri nor any 
representative signed.97 
 
In his lawsuit Silvestri made the following important 
concessions: 
 
that he had the ticket in his possession for at 
least three days before boarding the ship in New 
York and [then while in transit to] Italy, that he 
had looked at it prior to embarking, that he had 
consulted a lawyer in Italy, who had [contacted] 
the Italian Line without obtaining a satisfactory 
offer of settlement, and that he had given no 
written notice until the filing of the [suit more 
 
97. Id. Friendly‟s opinion pointed out that the English version was 
different from the Italian because the latter indicated “cover” and “leaves” 
while the English referred just to “cover.” Id. at 17. Friendly mentioned this 
discrepancy to reject any argument that Silvestri was misled; Silvestri‟s 
deposition showed he understood both Italian and English. Id. at 18 n.6. So 
did Friendly. 
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than one year after his injury].98 
 
The parties‟ briefs were cursory. The total number of pages 
in the briefs of the parties, including statements of facts and 
descriptions of the proceeding in the trial court, was eighteen 
and they demonstrated no particular familiarity with the law 
and little with the facts. Not only did the parties fail to provide 
significant assistance to Judge Friendly, other possible sources 
of aid likewise failed him. While Judge Friendly relied on some 
treatises, such as Harvard Professor Louis Loss‟ treatise on 
federal securities law, he received no help from treatises in 
Silvestri. 99 
At first blush the case seemed straightforward to the 
Second Circuit panel. After argument, they voted unanimously 
to affirm summary judgment entered in favor of defendant.100 
When Judge Friendly‟s opinion surfaced seven weeks after oral 
argument, however, it was written the other way—a 
unanimous vote to reverse and remand for a trial. He began his 
legal discussion with a caustic comment: “Silvestri‟s alternative 
arguments for reversal rest on the applicability of two Supreme 
Court decisions, The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375 (1897), and The 
Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U.S. 180 (1959), 
neither of which has been cited by counsel.”101 Having chastised 
Silvestri‟s lawyer, Judge Friendly got down to work. Silvestri 
 
98. Id. at 12-13. 
99. One famous treatise at the time said, “to be valid, a limitation [on a 
passenger ticket] must be fair and reasonable and not contrary to the dictates 
of public policy,” followed by a listing of some of the types of limitations. 10 
SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H. E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 1098 at 186-87 (3d ed. 1967). Footnotes cited representative 
cases without indicating their facts or outcome. Id. at nn. 7-9 (discussing 
Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co., 139 N.E. 226 (N.Y. 1923). Another leading 
treatise discussed passengers who accepted a transportation ticket without 
reading it: “He [a passenger] can not hold the insurer or carrier to a promise 
other than that contained in the document because the latter has made no 
other promise; and he can not have the contract set aside for mistake, 
because he has made no mistake.” 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
§ 607 at 661-62 (1960). Corbin,cited, inter alia, Murray, but provided no 
discussion of the case. Id. at n.17. 
100. Friendly Collection (on file with the Harvard Law School Library 
(Henry J. Friendly Collection, Box 18, Folder 3)). 
101. Silvestri, 388 F.2d at 13. 
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could prevail “only if the judge erred in ruling that the 
conditions were incorporated [into the passenger‟s contract], 
decision of which requires us to go back to The Majestic,”102 a 
case which he proceeded to discuss in prose rivaling Judge 
Cardozo‟s in elegance. 
 
That case stemmed from a misadventure of the 
Misses Potter who, with their maid, had sailed 
from Liverpool to New York in 1892. Despite the 
improvements in transatlantic navigation since 
the memorable voyage exactly four centuries 
earlier, the estimable young ladies found on 
disembarking that the contents of their trunks 
had been badly damaged by sea water. When 
they libeled the Majestic, they were met, among 
other defenses, with a ticket provision limiting 
liability “for loss of or injury to or delay in 
delivery of luggage” to 10 pounds. The ticket 
contained a “box” bearing the names of the 
passengers, alongside which was an agreement of 
carriage signed by the Oceanic Steam Navigation 
Company. Underneath this was a “Notice to 
Cabin Passengers” with provisions not relevant 
to the issue save for a reference “See Back”; on 
the back, under the rubric “Notice to 
Passengers,” like that on the front in bold face 
type, was a statement “This contract is made 
subject to the following conditions,” including, in 
fine type, the limitation of liability for luggage to 
which we have referred. The attention of the 
Misses Potter had not been called to this, nor had 
either of them read it. In a unanimous opinion . . 
. the Court allowed [the sisters] to recover . . . 
[holding] that the limitations “were not included 
in the contract proper, in terms or by 
reference.”103 
 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 13-14 (quoting The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375, 385 (1897)). 
Friendly extravagantly praised Judge Cardozo‟s writing style in Friendly, 
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It was time for Judge Friendly to discuss more recent 
precedents. He explained that, “[j]udicial efforts to determine 
what suffices to meet the rule of The Majestic have produced 
distinctions of considerable nicety.”104 Two lines of authority 
developed in the Second Circuit.105 Its early decisions ruled 
against “incorporation” of the conditions into the agreement 
between the passenger and the line, which meant the 
passenger was not bound by them.106 A later and contrary line 
of authority was based on Judge Cardozo‟s opinion in Murray v. 
Cunard S.S. Co.107 Judge Cardozo recited: 
 
The plaintiff‟s ticket . . . is described in large type 
as a “cabin passage contract ticket.” It provides, 
again in large type, that “this contract ticket is 
issued by the company and accepted by the 
passenger on the following terms and 
conditions.” . . . At the top of the ticket is printed 
a notice: “The attention of passengers is specially 
directed to the terms and conditions of this 
contract.”108 
 
Despite the fact the passenger had apparently been required to 
surrender the ticket on board the ship, Judge Cardozo 
“enforced a 40 day notification requirement.”109 Reversing the 
lower courts that had favored the plaintiff, Cardozo explained: 
 
This is not a case of a mere notice on the back of 
a ticket, separate either in substance or in form 
from the body of the contract. The Majestic, 166 
U.S. 375. Here the condition is wrought into the 
 
supra note 4, at 11-13. 
104. Silvestri, 388 F.2d at 14. 
105. Id. at 15. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co., 139 
N.E. 226, 227 (N.Y. 1923)). 
109. Id. 
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tissue, the two inseparably integrated. This 
ticket, to the most casual observer, is as plainly a 
contract, burdened with all kinds of conditions, 
as if it were a bill of lading or a policy of 
insurance. No one who could read could glance at 
it without seeing that it undertook . . . to 
prescribe the particulars which should govern 
the conduct of the parties until the passengers 
reached the port of destination. In such 
circumstances, the act of acceptance gives rise to 
an implication of assent.110 
 
“Despite the eminence of its authorship the Murray 
opinion did not at first have an enthusiastic reception in this 
court,” Judge Friendly remarked.111 Several opinions found 
Murray distinguishable and held for the passengers.112 But as 
the steamship companies created more forceful notices, the 
Second Circuit began to enforce the conditions. Discussing the 
decisions that favored defendants, Judge Friendly made 
statements like, “Examination of the record in Baron shows 
that both these legends were in solid capitals.”113 He learned 
these facts, not from the parties in his case, but by calling for 
and personally examining the records in other cases.114 If he 
could not distinguish cases from what appeared in the 
published opinions, he was prepared to rely on information 
that the courts did not include in their opinions.115 Judge 
 
110. Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting Murray, 139 N.E. at 228 (citation 
and internal quotation omitted)). 
111. Id. at 15. 
112. For a discussion of the opinions, see id. 
113. Id. at 15-16 & n.4 (citing Baron v. Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, 108 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1939)). 
114. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1967); 
United States ex rel. La Near v. La Vallee, 306 F.2d 417, 421-22 (2d Cir. 
1962); Interview with Paul Mogin, former clerk for Judge Friendly, in Wash., 
D.C. (Nov. 28, 2006). 
115. Judge Friendly evidently exhumed the court record in at least two 
other cases discussed in his opinion. While the nature of Friendly‟s research 
is hardly central to this article, it is worth noting that his creativity and 
diligence threatened to create problems, namely, that readers of opinions 
could not be certain that another judge would not rely on matters not 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/3
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Friendly attributed the shift in outcomes favoring steamship 
companies, in part, to: 
 
the disparity in the results with respect to 
steamship lines produced by the doctrine of The 
Majestic as against those attained by other 
carriers [railroads and Western Union] under the 
rule that valid limitations in tariffs filed with 
regulatory agencies of the United States are 
binding, whether embodied in the transportation 
documents . . . or not.116 
 
It was still necessary to decide Silvestri‟s claim, and Judge 
Friendly suggested a highly pragmatic standard that he 
gleaned from his thorough review of the decisions: 
 
[T]he thread that runs implicitly through the 
cases sustaining incorporation is that the 
steamship line had done all it reasonably could 
to warn the passenger that the terms and 
conditions were important matters of contract 
affecting his legal rights . . . . 
 
While we would not insist on any particular 
rubric, seventy years of experience under The 
Majestic doctrine should have enabled the 
draftsman of the ticket to produce a warning 
significantly more eye-catching than this. To be 
sure, it can be said that all this is legalism, since 
Silvestri should have known the Italian Line had 
not gone to the trouble of printing the Terms and 
 
contained in the opinion and thereby change its meaning. While engaging in 
a tour de force, Friendly was unilaterally changing the rules of the game in a 
potentially profound and disruptive way. Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., 
PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 751 (4th ed. 
2007) (“Citizens ought to be able to open up the statute books and find out 
what the law requires of them.”). 
116. Silvestri, 388 F.2d at 16-17 (citations omitted). 
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Conditions for the fun of it and would not have 
read them no matter what was said; and we 
confess some doubt how far the intensity of ticket 
reading by steamship passengers correlates with 
the strength of the invitation to indulge in it. All 
this, however, could have been said with equal 
accuracy of the Misses Potter, yet The Majestic 
decided what it did.117 
 
Judge Friendly did not offer much hope to Mr. Silvestri. 
After noting that Silvestri consulted a lawyer who should have 
been aware of the Italian Line‟s limitations on the time for 
bringing suit, and, moreover, that his lawyer may have 
obtained a duplicate of Silvestri‟s ticket, Judge Friendly 
abruptly ended the opinion: “If the company can establish that 
because of the lawyer‟s advice or otherwise Silvestri knew that 
the ticket required him to bring suit within a year, we might 
have a different case. We hold only it was error to grant 
summary judgment for respondent. Reversed.”118 Silvestri still 
faced a difficult task, but he had a chance. 
Judge Cardozo‟s biographer, Professor Andrew L. Kaufman 
of Harvard Law School, recognized that Judge Cardozo was 
often more charitable and reasonable than he was to Mr. 
Murray.119 Nevertheless, Palsgraf, along with another case to 
which Kaufman referred, suggest that Friendly was correct in 
saying that Judge Cardozo was more interested in general 
propositions than facts (or people): 
 
For some unspecified reason, Cardozo simply was 
not moved by his knowledge of common behavior 
to apply the “method of sociology” in this case. 
The logic of the rules won out. Rightly or 
wrongly, and I think wrongly, Cardozo saw this 
case as he had seen the case of the woman who 
 
117. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added). 
118. Id. at 18. 
119. KAUFMAN, supra note 3, at 356 (discussing Murray v. Cunard S.S. 
Co., 139 N.E. 226 (N.Y. 1923). 
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fell over the mechanic fixing the cash register. 
People had to take responsibility to look out for 
themselves sometimes, and Cardozo thought that 
this was one of these times.120 
 
Indeed, Judge Cardozo had a ready reason for deciding the case 
for Mr. Murray—the company had collected his ticket after he 
boarded, and one party to a contract ordinarily does not collect 
the other party‟s copy—but he nevertheless held the line for 
the company.121 
Judge Friendly was willing to take a step that Judge 
Cardozo was unwilling to take, namely, to accept the reality 
that passengers do not read all the terms on a ticket because 
they do not expect to find anything relevant to the main 
purpose of buying a ticket. Judge Friendly seems to have been 
more flexible and understanding than Judge Cardozo. Nearly 
forty years after Murray, perhaps it was time to accept the fact 
of life that travelers do not read the fine print on contracts and, 
indeed, are not really expected to. What would happen if 
renters of cars said, “One second, I want to read the contract”? 
Judge Friendly was more willing than Judge Cardozo to accept 
human behavior as a fact of life. Although he did not say so, 
Friendly may have thought that this was a very good case for a 
jury of Silvestri‟s peers to decide. What may have turned out to 
be an even more important difference between the two jurists, 
however, was that Judge Friendly and his wife took frequent 
cruises, while Judge Cardozo rarely traveled.122 Summa cum 
laude at Harvard College and Law School and Judge of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Judge 
Friendly, and his wife, may not have read their passenger 
tickets either. 
 
120. Id. at 358. The reference was to Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr 
Co., 177 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1931), where Cardozo had denied relief to a woman 
who walked before she looked. 
121. KAUFMAN, supra note 3, at 356. 
122. Id. at 147-49, 472-73. Professor Kaufman did note that Judge 
Cardozo had been on an ocean liner, although he did not say how many 
times. Id. at 357-58. The implication was that it was a small number, 
perhaps only one. See id. 
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Happenstance may change the outcome of a case, and it 
may have with Silvestri. Clerking for Judge Friendly at the 
time of Silvestri was Bruce Ackerman, now a professor at Yale 
Law School.123 Hiring brilliant law clerks, Judge Friendly 
preferred them to be outspoken, and Ackerman took him at his 
word.124 As Professor Ackerman has explained, Judge 
Friendly‟s initial reaction was to affirm on the ground that the 
notice provision was in the contract.125 Ackerman described 
what happened next: “I handed him the contract and asked 
him to read it. That was unfair; he couldn‟t read shit. But he 
changed his mind.”126 As Ackerman (and others) well knew, 
Judge Friendly‟s eyesight was poor and he had difficulty 
reading even ordinary-sized print. 
 
III. 
 
While respectful, Judge Friendly was skeptical of Judge 
Cardozo‟s approaches in Palsgraf and Murray, and was 
inclined to be more generous to the plaintiffs and expand the 
responsibilities of the defendants. Judge Friendly‟s opinion 
implied that Palsgraf might be outdated because at least a 
modicum of law and economics orientation, including looking at 
who was in a better position to bear, share, or prevent the loss, 
was appropriate nearly four decades after Judge Cardozo wrote 
his opinion. In Silvestri Judge Friendly veered from formal 
concepts like “incorporation” and asked the more practical 
question whether the steamship company did all it reasonably 
could to bring the notice requirement to the attention of the 
passengers. He could have asked, but did not, which party was 
better able to prevent or insure against the loss, although it 
may have been in the back of his mind, as it was in the earlier 
Kinsman. 
 
123. Interview with Prof. Bruce Ackerman in New Haven, Conn. (Aug. 6, 
2007). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. Ackerman wrote the initial draft of Bushey, see id., an 
unabashedly law and economics approach. Friendly‟s published opinion was 
more traditional. 
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